Critiquing 'Common Cause'

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Green House Post-growth Project

Everyone agrees that we are in the midst of a massive financial and economic crisis. We have suffered the biggest crash since the 30s, and it may get far bigger yet. How ought this ongoing crisis to be understood, and resolved?

There is the mainstream view: we have vast government deficits, and stagnant economies. We have a dire need for economic growth – and a deep-set need for austerity, bringing with it massive cuts in public services.

But what if that diagnosis, which reflects mainstream wisdom, is all wrong? What if the crisis that we are currently experiencing is one which casts into doubt the entire edifice of capitalist economics that sets growth as the primary objective of all policy? What if the fight between those who say that without austerity first there can be no growth and those who say that we must invest and borrow more now in order to resume growth is a false dichotomy – because both sides are assuming 'growthism' as an unquestioned dogma?

The aim of the Green House Post-growth Project is to challenge the common sense that assumes that it is 'bad news' when the economy doesn't grow and to analyse what it is about the structure of our economic system that means growth must always be prioritised. We need to set out an attractive, attainable vision of what one country would look like, once we deliberately gave up growth-mania – and of how to get there. And we need to find ways of communicating this to people that make sense, and that motivate change.

Green House Post-growth Project Reports

'Green House's 'Post-growth' Project: an introduction' by Rupert Read.

'Joined up Economics: The Political Economy of Sustainability, Financial Crises, Wages, Equality and Welfare' by Brian Heatley.

'Smaller but Better? Post-growth Public Services' by Andrew Pearmain and Brian Heatley.

'The Paradox of a Green Stimulus' by Molly Scott Cato.

'Can't Pay; Won't Pay: Austerity, Audit and Odious Debt' by Molly Scott Cato.

'The Politics of Post-Growth' by Andrew Dobson.

'How to Make, do and Mend our Economy: Rethinking Capital Investment in Construction and Industry: the Scale and Depth of the Challenge of the Green Transition' by Jonathan Essex.

'A new Post-growthist Common Sense: Challenging the Hegemony of Growthist Discourse' by Rupert Read.

These papers are also available in a book, The Post-Growth Project: How the End of Economic Growth Could Bring a Fairer and Happier Society
Edited by: John Blewitt and Ray Cunningham, with contributions from Molly Scott Cato, Andrew Dobson, Jonathan Essex, Brian Heatley, Andrew Pearmain and Rupert Read.
Go to http://londonpublishingpartnership.co.uk/the-post-growth-project/ for further details.

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Introduction

By Victor Anderson, Sam Earle, and Rupert Read

The 'Common Cause' analysis of values and their important role in social change has influenced many campaigning organisations, and articulated in a very clear form what many people have been thinking. We share the belief in the importance of values – but don't see it in the same way that Common Cause do. In this pamphlet we set out a different view of our own, and the reasons why we disagree with Common Cause.

The three of us writing this differ in how much we think Common Cause needs 'correcting'. Read's contribution to this report is very sympathetic to Common Cause, but makes some targeted criticisms especially of the legacy of the Schwarzian circumplex for Common Cause. Earle's contribution makes more far-reaching criticisms of the Common Cause approach, invoking its own academic hinterland in order to do so. Finally, Anderson's approach is the most critical, bringing in perspectives from political economy and political theory to question certain fundamental features of the approach.

We offer these criticisms in the spirit of friendly discussion and of debate between people (ourselves, and the advocates of Common Cause) who are all basically on the same side in the same struggle, for a greener, deeply-reframed, more collectively-oriented world. We have found previous debates around Common Cause (notably, with the Dade-Rose 'values modes'[1] alternative and pre-existing 'social marketing' approach) rather bad tempered. We hope that this report initiates a happier and perhaps therefore more productive debate.

In his famous co-authored report, 'Common Cause' (2010), Tom Crompton argues that political and NGO campaigns that seek to promote desirable pro-environmental behaviours inevitably appeal to cultural values through framing, thus affecting public responses to those campaigns. Invoking Schwartz's 'values circumplex' (e.g. 1992) (see figure 1), Crompton cautions, rightly, that careful attention must be paid to the sorts of values evoked when framing campaigns and communications. Schwartz (e.g.1994) argued that values constitute a coherent schema, in which shifts in the importance of certain values will incur changes throughout the schema. This is because values are interconnected: a given value will be compatible with adjacent values (on the schema), but contradictory to opposing values. For example, evoking a self-enhancing value, such as power (e.g. social status), will have the concomitant effect of suppressing self-transcendent values such as universalism (e.g. welfare for all), which are on the opposite pole of the circumplex. Given that many environmental problems are 'bigger-than-self' (Crompton, 2010), in that they pertain to issues distally and temporally removed from an individual's immediate present, finding adequate solutions to them will require promoting behaviours that relate more to self-

transcendence (beyond oneself), rather than self-enhancement (for oneself). Crompton argues that campaigns should not prime extrinsic motivations, as they tend to encourage and reinforce self-interested values and suppress more universalistic values. Instead, then, Crompton calls for framing to encourage intrinsic values, and urges campaigners to be transparent, and engage citizens in dialogue about the purpose of, and need for, the frames and values being targeted.

Our view is that, while there is much that is right about this approach, there is also much that is wrong with it. We therefore essay here some constructive criticisms of 'Common Cause'.


Figure 1. Schwartz's Circumplex of Values.

Schwartz, S.H. (1992). Universals in the content and structure of values: theoretical advances and empirical tests in 20 countries. In M.P. Zanna, ed. *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology*, 25. Orlando: Academic Press, pp. 1-65.

I. How to critically synthesise nudging, leadership, reflection and value-change: an agenda for NGOs and for politics, after 'Common Cause' and 'Sustainability Citizenship'.

By Rupert Read

In 2010, WWF-UK published a report written by Tom Crompton et al entitled 'Common Cause, the case for working with our cultural values' (Crompton et al, 2010; 'CC'). In 2011, Green House (as part of its launch) published a report written by Andy Dobson entitled 'Sustainability Citizenship'. These two reports -- which push a broadly similar approach to the question of how to change policy, politics, behaviour and values, disagreeing with previously dominant 'social marketing' and 'nudging' approaches -- are in my opinion both impressive and important. They - especially Crompton's - have set the agenda in terms of how NGOs etc. ought to think deeply about what values they are promoting, in their efforts to foster real change. I am a huge admirer in this regard of Crompton's and of Dobson's work. (I consider myself very definitely in common cause with them.)

However, I think that there are some problems with both that need addressing. I want to offer some constructive criticisms and then outline an approach that could successfully address those problems.

I contend that both pieces are falsely dichotomising: the circumplex model of values on which Crompton draws heavily claims that certain values necessarily suppress others, which is questionable. Similarly Dobson's blanket rejection of nudge/choice architecture seems to imply that such tools could not be used beneficially in conjunction with policies that promote 'Sustainability Citizenship', which is unfounded. Dobson's ultimate recommendations are sound, but, I feel, could be supplemented by considering some ways in which 'choice architecture' could be used responsibly within a normativity agenda to promote 'sustainabilty' etc. I return briefly to this point below.

In what follows, I will mainly focus on Crompton's report, as it has had a significantly greater influence in the 'real world', and also because Dobson's report is in my view less vulnerable than Crompton's to the main criticism that I shall make in what follows.

In his report Crompton argues that political and NGO campaigns that seek to promote desirable pro-environmental behaviours inevitably appeal to cultural values through framing, to affect public responses. Invoking Schwartz's 'values circumplex' (e.g. 1992),

There is much about this approach that I find deeply amenable and important. But: the 'circumplex' (http://valuesandframes.org/handbook/2-how-values-work/) beloved by Common Cause fans is potentially antithetical to the *leadership* that ought in my view to be offered the values-based approach[2] (as opposed to what I would call the 'green social marketing' approach of Dade and Rose[3]). The dangerous idea that the 'circumplex' presents is that being powerful and achieving things is *necessarily* opposed psychologically to being universalistic and benevolent in one's values. But: We need to pioneer a renewed sense of shared responsibility for the future. We need to *lead* the way[4] successfully to this goal being a common cause.

Now, of course, Common Cause explicitly recognises the need for such leadership at a number of points. But the danger remains that the circumplex can appear to trap us in an alleged deeper psychological 'reality' that appears to make leadership, winning, and achievement impossible for those who wish to remain ethical. Whereas the truth is this (and this is where politics and philosophy trump psychology): Psychology as a 'science' risks seeming to limit us into what has been the case in the past. But the future is open: we make the future together (albeit not under circumstances of our choosing). We make social reality, and continually remake it. It is not set in stone for us by any alleged psychological 'results'.

Achieving such leadership is going to take a great deal of *achievement*.[5] We didn't get to be pioneers without achieving, and nor will we in the future. Green reframers are interested in radical and even revolutionary change to our society. That change will necessarily involve people dramatically stepping into leadership roles, and changing the world. It will involve 'power' and 'achievement'. Saying things that simply make it sound as if that is incompatible with being good risks standing directly in the way of what needs doing.

To suggest, as the psychological circumplex does, that we are stuck in a situation in which actually winning is incompatible with the values we need is disastrous. Human existence is 'dialectical'. Psychological reality is not fixed in the way that the values approach risks suggesting that it is. It is not an object of science.[6]

The Schwartzian/Cromptonian approach could potentially be modified to deal with my criticisms here.[7] I hope it will be. The modifications required would include the social psychology being clear that it is not for all time; just a slightly crude and vague snapshot of the present time in particular societies.[8] The pursuit of power/achievement and the pursuit of social justice etc. are not irreconcilable: it is just that these two things are at present difficult to pursue simultaneously.

It's very important moreover to be clear about what we mean by 'power' and 'achievement'. Schwartz defines 'power' as "social status and prestige, control or dominance over people and resources"; 'achievement' as "personal success through demonstrating competence according to social standards" (e.g. 2003). These are

prejudicial definitions. They should be changed, or else it should be accepted that the actuality of the achievement of political power is not necessarily to be understood according to anything represented in the circumplex: one can pursue and achieve political power, for the common good, without actually falling under these definitions!

Moreover, the Schwartzian approach at times tacitly denigrates sociality and applauds individuality – this is almost certainly a cultural bias probably resulting from the unaware absorption of elements of contemporary Western (especially American) 'common-sense' into an allegedly scientific psychology of humanity. There is nothing wrong (and much right) with seeking to match up to social standards: provided that the standards in question are not corrupt. The value in themselves of society and of community risks being tacitly undervalued by *individualism* motivating the circumplex. Whereas actually what we need in the 21st century is a deeply 'communitarian' ethic. (And this provides an opening to thinking about the potential for appealing to the cohort of persons that Dade and Rose call 'settlers'. 'Settlers' have a mentality that is in some key respects far from that of the 'pioneers' whose way of being tends to be closest to the psychology sought after in *Common Cause*. *But* settlers and pioneers meet in 'we', in community. The pioneers' sense of community, as inclusive as possible, should deliberately seek to include settlers and their need for a sense of security and belonging, genuine desiderata that are seriously under threat in our hyper world. Pioneers should seek common cause with settlers.) Those seeking to achieve political power for good ends must *of course* not lose sight completely of the means they use, lest they become corrupt; but often, in what they seek to achieve, as they work on a day to day level, they will not be thinking much in a reflective way about those means, nor even of the good ends they are seeking. They will simply have their heads down in pursuit of being elected, etc. Any account of social and political change which demonises this, including the driving desire to achieve positions of power, is part of the problem rather than of the solution, because it leaves the whole system open to domination by the friends of the rich and powerful, the ill-intentioned, and the purely selfish.

So, in sum, I am arguing that Common Cause risks being too puristical: its dogmatic adherence to the Schwartzian 'circumplex' is defeatist or ahistorical, neglecting the way that human beings can fight against the tendency for some values to 'drive out' others, especially once that tendency is brought to consciousness. Common Cause risks setting activists up dogmatically against leadership, against achievement, against victory, against deep change: it risks being a manifesto for self-righteous impotence.

Somewhat similarly: Dobson's blanket rejecting of all forms of behaviour-change-making risks being dogmatic. (We should for starters embrace harmless and positive ecological paternalism: such as stencilling flies onto gents' urinals). By contrast, however, the onus of Dobson's report is about engaging citizens with the complex

normative and ethical questions and debates. It is thus facilitative of reflection and 'autonomous' engagement.

I argue that what is needed is an approach that goes further still (than either of these): that embraces values of leadership and achievement. Indeed, embracing leadership in times of radical change is exactly what moral pioneers have always had to do - and as historically embedded citizens, it behoves us to heed this lesson. Furthermore, this is arguably where what one might call virtues of leadership (of which Greens and some portions of the Left have been historically suspicious, with detrimental results) come in. I would argue that the expedience afforded by nudge approaches, when undertaken transparently, could be of great value in manifesting such leadership and in promoting 'sustainable' practices.

Consider John Foster's calls in his bold new book *After Sustainability* (2015, p.208), for the environmental movement to become a 'vanguard social agent': "This will be a movement that knows itself to represent the survival instinct and life-energy of the whole community, which unashamedly recruits as many of those with effective power as it can, which seizes initiatives as they present themselves, waits for no majoritarian permissions and makes no apology for acting in the living interests of all." This is the kind of spirit we are likely to need if we are somehow to find a way through the dire state that our species now finds itself in.

Thus I would recommend to activists, politicians, policy-makers etc. that they strike a balance among these things, overcoming the limitations of the Dobsonian and Cromptonian approaches – approaches that have brilliantly pushed the frontier of thinking around values and framing, but which have run into limits of their own - by producing a new synthesis. I aspire thus to further Green House's grand project of 'deep reframing' for and toward a post-growth world.

The deep-reframing work that is above all needed now, in order to make politically possible a (post-growth) future, is *not* psychology understood as science. It is rather 'applied philosophy' of the kind offered here. It is politics carried out via linguistic and rhetorical thinking placed in a setting of engagement with ecological realities. This is continuous with (George Lakoff and) Crompton at their best, in their genius – it is not continuous with the scientistic self-image that at times distorts their achievements and that is in the end offered only to provide a would-be legitimacy in a culture that is profoundly deformed by scientism (and, concomitantly, by dangerously technocratic values), a culture where science is venerated as religion once was, and without greater grounds. (And of course such scientism is profoundly antipathetic to the true spirit of science, which is in crucial part one of scepticism, not of holiness and veneration, which lead to unjust authority and dogmatism.)

The work of Green House is above all this deep-reframing work. Effective political communications in a situation that demands genuine leadership cannot possibly be a

matter of focus groups. We are interested in *changing* the perceived bounds of political and economic possibility; *changing* what is seen as 'realistic'; *reorienting* the political culture of our country (our world) such that the common-sense that gets bounced back at politicians from focus groups etc is itself changed.[9]

Part of that reorientation will come from an embracing of a fundamentally precautious aspect to thinking and acting in our world that has bought into too much speed and recklessness.[10] And here we come across a slightly different objection to 'Nudge' than is contained in Dobson's report. The real problem with 'Nudge' is that, by bypassing citizens, what the technocratic elite takes to be beneficial will be gently 'imposed' upon the broader populace *even if it contains within it silent risks*. What the elite judges to be benefits may well harbour possible tail-risks that are catastrophic. (I would worry, for instance, that in the coming years 'nudge-architecture' may well be used to seek to get GM food to be normalised.)

We need to empower citizens to bite back against this, and to guard thus against such recklessness. Societal hegemony thus needs changing. This will require activism and leadership of the kind I argued for above; it will also require the kinds of broader alliance-building (finding common causes!) of the kind recommended by Victor Anderson, in his contribution toward this report. Common-sense itself needs shifting, for a deep reframing that could save us.[11]

It would not be possible to test the proposals I have made elsewhere using standard psychological methods, like lab experiments or focus groups.[12] For these are proposals for a *society-scale* movement, a change from one ideology to another.[13] A great transition, a great turning. They are, as I've said, proposals for a new common-sense. It is no more possible to test them out than it is to have an evidence-based revolution. A revolution is by definition not a piecemeal reform, by definition not something that can be argued for solely on the basis of facts and evidence. It is a wholesale transformation, by definition a partly unforeseeable and uncontrollable process of will, emotion, organisation, development, and dialectics. I am not saying that it will necessarily literally take a revolution to bring in a post-growth future, the kind of future that Green House - and Dobson, and Crompton - aspire to.[14] I am saying that both the process of transformation to a self-avowedly post-growth society and that society itself necessitate a kind of conceptual rupture from what we are used to.[15] To both Dobson and Crompton I would urge: you have helped create the situation where we can start to imagine that transformation. Thank you. And now: please embrace a little *more* of that rupture.[16]

II. Outlining Some Confusions of the Common Cause Approach to Values

By Sam Earle

Tom Crompton's 2010 report entitled 'Common Cause, the case for working with our cultural values' (Crompton, 2010) is premised on the fact that political and NGO campaigns that seek to promote desirable pro-environmental behaviours inevitably appeal to cultural values through framing, to affect public responses. His contention is that careful attention must be paid to the sorts of values evoked when framing campaigns and communications, or else there is a risk of inadvertently prompting the opposite of the desired effect.

To make this claim, Crompton appeals to the work of Shalom Schwartz, whose work on values has dominated the literature on values psychology. Schwartz (e.g.1994) argues that values comprise a coherent schema, in which shifts in the importance of certain values will incur changes throughout the schema - represented as a circumplex. This is because values are interconnected: a given value will be compatible with values adjacent on the schema, but contradictory to opposing values. For example, evoking a self-enhancing value, such as social status, would suppress self-transcendent values, such as concern for others, which are on the opposite pole of the circumplex.

Given that many environmental problems are 'bigger-than-self' (Crompton, 2010), in that they pertain to issues distally and temporally removed from an individual's immediate present, finding adequate solutions to them will require the promotion of behaviours that relate more to self-transcendence (beyond oneself) than to self-enhancement (for oneself). The negative consequences on environmental, and therein social, issues of self-enhancing behaviour is perhaps best described in Garret Hardin's seminal piece, 'Tragedy of the Commons' (1968), in which he argued that individuals seeking to maximise their own wealth will destroy the source of the wealth. Cooperation, on the other hand, can ensure sustainable governance of shared resources, as demonstrated by Elinor Ostrom's Nobel Prize winning work "Governing the Commons" (1990).

Crompton refers to self-transcendent values as akin to intrinsic goals/motivations (e.g. community, affiliation to friends and family, and self-development), and to self-enhancing values as akin to extrinsic motivations (e.g. concern for status, desire for wealth and power) (2010). Thus, the crux of his argument is that campaigns should not prime extrinsic motivations, as they tend to encourage and reinforce self-interested values and suppress more universalistic values. Instead he calls for framing

to encourage intrinsic values, and for campaigners to be transparent, and engage citizens in dialogue about the purpose of, and need for the frames and values being targeted.

I am very sympathetic to Common Cause's aims, and I strongly welcome the revival of values in public discourse. But it is precisely because I feel that the issue is so important that I find the hasty and uncircumspect adoption- and, as I shall explain, conflation- of the prevalent psychology values literature to be rather alarming. Although some of the literature in this ilk has merit, much of it is highly questionable, and none of it steps back to consider what is meant by values, and why and how they might be important to society. In other words, a carefully developed normative basis is completely absent, as all studies blithely presume a preconceived normative basis, which in many cases boils down to Schwartz's dubious conceptions.

Thus I offer what follows – a critique of the approach, methods and implications – of Crompton's work to help radicalise the way we think about values, and to work towards greater collaboration between philosophers and psychologists in shaping values' contribution to society's future.

First, I shall argue that Crompton conflates Schwartz's circumplex with self-determination theory (SDT) of Ryan and Deci[17], and thus overlooks the crucial element of autonomy. Secondly, I shall show that Crompton does not distinguish between consciously held values and mere norms. Thirdly I argue that a 2012 Common Cause study of priming intrinsic values has significant limitations, and will move on to suggest that priming intrinsic values is inherently contradictory, insofar as framing is passively affecting. Finally, I will suggest that an alternative would be deep framing that focuses on autonomy and self-awareness in order to facilitate greater intrinsic orientation.

Continuum vs. Circumplex

The concept of intrinsic and extrinsic values/ motivations belongs to SDT, which posits that intrinsic motivations and values are inherently rewarding, including things like personal growth, relationships, community and health, whereas extrinsic values include wealth, fame, image, and power, for example. At first glance, this dichotomy appears closely related to that of Schwartz's circumplex poles, as explained above. SDT rests on the three fundamental psychological needs: autonomy, competence and relatedness, which are crucial to a proper understanding of SDT. Rather than operating around a circumplex (as Schwartz's values do), SDT's values work along a continuum, from extrinsic to intrinsic, in which the two extremes of the continuum are characterised by a lack of agency and full agency, respectively.

Extrinsic motivations can come to resemble intrinsic values through internalising them. This can be achieved by, for example, realising their importance to promoting

desirable end-states. The greater the degree of this internalisation, the greater the element of agency (i.e. locus of control is self). I would argue that these "extrinsic" values can be understood as "instrumental values", and intrinsic values as "ultimate values". In other words, if we are to be motivated to act to realise our values, we must first be aware which our ultimate values are (like family or equality), so that we can then employ instrumental values (like wealth or power[18]) to the service of their realisation.

If this distinction is not made, it is easy to see how obviously instrumental values like wealth, power or liberty get mistaken for ultimate values, and lead to inconsistent behaviours. This is an important distinction, because it shows how when extrinsic values become instrumental to ultimate/intrinsic values, they can no longer be said to oppose and suppress them, but in fact serve them. The distinction between instrumental and ultimate values was noted by Rokeach (1968), upon whose work Schwartz heavily draws. But Schwartz rejected this approach. As such, his work is simply not compatible with SDT, and conflating the two theories will ultimately jar. Where Schwartz led, much of subsequent work on the psychology of values has followed, without ever questioning the basis of Schwartzian approach.

Values Consciousness vs. Values as Mere Norms

The process of internalising extrinsic values, as offered by SDT, requires agency in the cognitive effort involved: it requires self-examination in order to recognise one's core (ultimate/intrinsic) values, so that extrinsic/instrumental values can be made congruent with them. This links to the second confusion that punctuates Crompton's report: the conflation of 'cultural' and 'personal' values.[19] Although a clear theoretical distinction is not made in the literature, such a distinction is still discernible. Indeed, Schwartz notes that values can be acquired through both the socialisation process and through an individual's unique learning process. Such values are variously referred to as chosen, core/central to the self, highly consistent and belonging to highly private-self-conscious people, and seem to describe different psychological phenomena from values described variously as susceptible to social influence and priming, of low consistency, and unconsciously held . I would argue, then, that we should be careful to distinguish between central values, which are important to self, usually involving high cognition and consistency and which are akin to intrinsic values, and those 'cultural values' to which Crompton refers and more resemble mere norms that are "relatively bereft of cognitive support" (Maio and Olson, 1998, p.294).

 This is an important qualification: it indicates that the intrinsic values that Crompton wishes to encourage are those that, unlike mere norms, are not easily manipulated through priming, but involve agency and high cognitive awareness. Furthermore, values as mere norms, denies the crucial element of SDT of autonomy, through which

extrinsic values can be internalised, and through which intrinsic motivations can be served.

Passive intrinsic-orientation?

In order to substantiate the claim that intrinsic values can be primed, Common Cause conducted empirical research, in which subjecting highly extrinsically-oriented people to intrinsic priming resulted in increased expression of intrinsic or 'bigger-than-self' concerns (Chilton et al, 2012). However, the implications of this study are limited. For example, the longevity of the effect of the priming is unknown. Research suggests, however, that such priming is likely to be short term, unless it is made familiar through repetition. (Chong and Druckman, 2007). Furthermore, expressing concern in interviews is not at all the same thing as actually behaving in such a manner. Further still, a lab environment, in which a participant is exposed to a single primer, in no way reflects real-life settings in which people are consistently subjected to manifold and contradictory framing and influences. I do not wish to single the Common Cause study out as particularly shoddy, rather its many and insuperable problems are symptomatic of any endeavour to subject values to quasi-scientific lab tests in an unchecked drive to quantify something inherently qualitative.[20]

It seems that attempting to prime intrinsic values - as opposed to norms - through passive framing will only yield contradictions. In his report, Crompton repeatedly refers to 'embedding' certain 'helpful' cultural values through framing. Ironically, in doing so, he is framing his argument in terms of external locus of control and values as mere norms, which are inherently contrary to the intrinsic values he seeks to promote! SDT stresses that intrinsic orientation must be *catalysed*, not *caused* (2000, p.58). However, Crompton does urge a more participatory form of 'deep framing', rather than relying on covert manipulation, stressing the need for transparency about "the values that a campaign…seeks to activate, presenting for public scrutiny both the evidence that these values will help to achieve the aims of that campaign, and the ways that the frames they deploy will help to strengthen these values" (2010, p.60). However, without consulting on the *actual* values promoted, campaigns will never be truly participatory and risk being paternalistic. Furthermore, it could be argued that justifying priming *after* the fact, is at best manufactured consent, and at worst, a form of doublespeak- because if the priming has been successful, the subject will de facto think it's a good thing!

Framing as Catalysts for Autonomy, Efficacy and Relatedness

'Deep framing' can be useful in engendering more self-transcendent values and motivations, especially when incorporating the principles of transparency, coherence, and working towards systemic change through institutional coalitions, which Crompton advocates. These cultural values will then influence people's private values. The crucial issue of whether these values remain non-cognitive norms, or the intrinsic values that Crompton seeks, hinges on the degree to which the deep framing

incorporates the three key components of SDT: autonomy, competence and relatedness. These three tenets also require strong self-awareness and reflexivity. Although developing cognitive abilities and self-awareness is far more difficult and long-term, it has several advantages: it will produce long-term effects (as opposed to short-term priming); it will facilitate adaptive and responsive behaviour in the light of new/challenging information; it will facilitate congruence and therein greater well-being; it avoids ethical problems inherent in paternalistic framing and manipulative priming; and may strengthen overall cognitive performance.

Finally, it is worth observing that it behoves society to encourage reflection and autonomy as far as possible, rather than perpetuate a public as malleable and ultimately conformist. The work of Milgram and Zimbardo serves to highlight the potentially catastrophic consequences of non-evaluative conforming. Although their studies arguably demonstrate more authority-obedience than social conformity, they are still pertinent here, insofar as values as mere norms are manufactured by the elite, and involve an entirely external locus of control.

Conclusion

In this piece, I have sought to challenge Crompton's Common Cause work on its own terms: through explaining instances of conflation of the theories of Shalom Schwartz and SDT, which ultimately are at odds; through highlighting some of the methodological problems inherent in trying to quantify values; through distinguishing between values proper and mere cultural norms; and through drawing out the unpalatable implications of 'priming values'. I hope that the issues I've raised will serve to show how the values literature in social psychology broadly lacks a well-considered normative basis – and there has been very little, if any, radical reflection on what the concept of values really means. Taken alongside the contributions of my colleagues Read and Anderson, I hope this will help blow open the values debate, and lead to greater, collaborative consideration of the role of values in shaping the future of society.

III. Common Cause: A Critique

By Victor Anderson

The views about "values and frames" promoted by Common Cause have had a great deal of influence on the Left, in NGOs and within social movements. I find the extent of this influence shocking and deeply worrying. In my contribution to our pamphlet, I will set out why I take this view.

I will start, however, by saying that of course I accept the importance of values and the need for the values of our society to change. My disagreements with Common Cause are about how values shift should be placed in the overall context of bringing about social change, the relative importance of values shift, and how it connects with other aspects of change.

I also want to emphasise my agreement with the idea that "frames" matter. The "framing" that we employ to discuss and justify our views – the language we use, the metaphors we adopt, the information that we present as relevant, the criteria we imply we accept – all of this matters hugely. A key part of "framing" is the role or identity we appear to address when we speak to other people: the "consumer" identity or the "citizen" identity, for example. However this does not by itself justify some of the conclusions which have been drawn by Common Cause and others – a point I will return to later.

I also want to acknowledge the frustration I share with the advocates of Common Cause about the current slowness of positive social change, and in many cases its reversal. It is not surprising that this frustration leads to the search for a "silver bullet" to solve the problem with one all-encompassing solution. However I do not believe the realities of change are really like that.

A further point it is necessary to concede from the start is that the authors of the Common Cause material have included wording which has the effect of moderating the overall claims they make. For example, they say that "It is clear, however, that values are not the sole determinant of our behaviour ..." ('Common Cause Handbook', 2011, p25). There are mentions at various points of other factors, such as power and money. But these mentions are only ever brief, and their implications are not pursued. This means that values are not considered in the context of the other major factors which influence people's behaviour and processes of social change.

I have four main objections to the Common Cause analysis. These focus on the areas of (i) power, (ii) ideology, (iii) alliances, (iv) the values categories it uses. I will say very little about the values categories, because these are discussed in other contributions to this pamphlet. However I will have quite a bit to say about the other three problem areas, and then finish off my contribution by discussing what I think

the popularity of Common Cause tells us about the current state of social movement politics in the UK.

Power

Common Cause is a very unusual type of political analysis, because it has very little to say about power and the distribution of power. There is a brief reference to the power of vested interests (CC Handbook p5) and the fact that if we lack power, we lack the means to put our values into practice. However it is clear that for Common Cause, power is nowhere near the centre of its analysis.

This has the implication that therefore no strategy is required to shift power from one group of people or institutions to another, because what matters is values and not how power is distributed, organised and contested. The starting point Common Cause adopts means that it doesn't need to engage with any of the trains of thought which have been pursued on the question of power, even though that has been a central question for a wide variety of political traditions over centuries. This is because what happens in society is seen as, above all, the consequence of the values its members hold.

This would make some sense in an ultra-democratic society, in which power was evenly distributed and so there was a direct correspondence between the popularity or unpopularity of various values and the outcomes in political, business, and other decision-making. We do not live in such a society.

We live in a society in which power is very unevenly distributed, including crucially both political power and the economic power which is expressed above all through the allocation and movement of money. However what matters in the context of Common Cause is not so much that rather obvious observation, but the fact that there is actually in practice a very big difference in the values of those with and without power.

Tim Kasser's (2002) work in the USA has shown this very clearly. There is a mismatch between people's values and social outcomes for the very simple reason that the institutions and people with power – above all, politicians and businesspeople – have different values from those of the rest of society. Decision-making is therefore skewed away from majority values and towards these minority values. A change in the values of the majority will have only a limited impact on the decisions made by the minority.

This should not be particularly surprising. If you are a senior person in politics or business, you are probably ambitious, competitive, focused on getting results, and willing to make sacrifices in terms of for example family life, peace and quiet, leisure pursuits, and so on – things which turn out to be much more important to the less-driven majority of the population, who tend to hold values much closer to those advocated by Common Cause.

In fact, we might even argue that there is not much wrong with the values of the majority. The problem is that the social institutions which have power do not reflect those values. This problem would not be solved by an improvement in the majority's values, but requires instead either different people to populate the powerful institutions, or (perhaps more plausibly) different social institutions to become powerful. The Common Cause approach does not look into those possibilities – although their latest report, 'Perceptions Matter' (2016, p.28) provides additional evidence which points in this direction.

There are two additional points about power which are also significant here. One is that people often lack the power over their own lives which they would need in order to put their values into practice. It is true that we often underestimate our personal power and freedom, but it still remains clear that these are limited, even if only by the previous choices we have made in our lives, for example to pursue a particular training and career. To imagine there is a straightforward relationship between values and actions is to wish away this rather important problem.

There is also the related question of money as a form of power. The "green consumer" needs some purchasing power, and green products are usually more expensive than other products. Many people make a definite distinction between what their values tell them would be the right thing to do and what they feel their incomes make it sensible for them to do. Money is a form of power, giving much more power to some people than to others, but – in contrast to many other analyses, ranging all the way from free market economics to monetary reform to Marxism – it plays only a tiny part in the Common Cause view of the world.

Ideology

The problem with Common Cause extends much further than the fact that there is no direct correspondence between social values and the decisions made by powerful institutions. There is also no direct correspondence between values and the outcomes of decisions.

This is because the connection between someone's values and the decisions they opt for, or the policies they support, or the political conclusions they draw from their values, is far from straightforward. In between values and choices come beliefs.

What I mean here by "beliefs" is essentially ideas about how the world works, and crucially that includes ideas about the cause-and-effect relationships between particular policy choices and what are thought to be their likely outcomes.

Two people might share exactly the same values but have very different views about the decisions and policies that follow from those values. For example, someone may believe strongly in security as a value, and so may someone else, and they may agree that this includes military security. Then the issue is raised: should the UK remain in NATO? The first person may say that because of the importance of security as a

value, it is essential to remain in NATO. Someone else might point out that this puts the UK in a military alliance in which the country is pledged to come to the aid of Turkey if it is attacked, a stance which, given the state of the Middle East, is arguably a huge threat to UK security. Agreement on the value of military security doesn't translate into agreement about what is the best policy to achieve it.

Again, as with the earlier point about the unequal distribution of power, this is fairly obvious. What makes it seriously problematic for the Common Cause approach is that the beliefs which exist in society about how to implement the values we each have are greatly influenced by major social institutions which overwhelmingly seek to push those beliefs in one direction rather than another.

This can be described as the problem of "ideology". The mainstream media, mainstream political parties, most major businesses, and most of the education system are united in their support for neoliberal political and economic ideas. This is the dominant ideology of our time in Western countries. It is also something which most Common Cause supporters oppose, and yet they fail to take into account how important and problematic it is for their own analysis.

We may have all the success we wish for in shifting social values in a good direction, but then if someone with those good values then reads what 'The Daily Mail' tells them about how to deliver those values, we may end up with no improvement in decisions and policies at all.

Alliances

Most analyses of politics and social change highlight power and belief – and also a third element which is often equally important: the need for alliances. Major social change is rarely brought about by people pushing for the same thing for the same reason. Different groups of people often have different reasons, and the most successful campaigns are often those which unite people with a single aim but who have very different reasons for trying to achieve it, based on different beliefs and different values.

Common Cause, however, argues for a "purer" position. It wants to see campaigns being won not only because they have the right aims and would improve society and people's lives, but because they are supported and argued for for the right reasons, from out of the right values. Campaigns are seen as important not so much because of what they might achieve, but because of the underlying values they communicate.

However, when compared with the realities of political campaigning, this approach can quickly be seen to be problematic and in some cases even an obstacle to change. Here are some examples, each of which could create difficulties for the Common Cause approach. In each case, there are competing considerations to be either balanced or decided on. The Common Cause approach, however, appears to give

ready-made answers, which it seems to me for each of these three examples would be a wrong answer.

- Suppose Prince Charles supports your environmental campaign. The monarchy is the summit of unearned privilege, contravening basic principles of both democracy and social justice. Do you therefore turn down his support?

- Local residents oppose the expansion of Heathrow because they hate aircraft noise. Do you tell them that's a trivial issue in comparison to climate change?

- A charismatic celebrity seeks to boost their celebrity status still further by offering to be a public face for your campaign. Do you turn that down on the grounds that it furthers the values of egotistical ambition and the worship of celebrity? (see CCH p61)

Common Cause literature acknowledges that this is a problematic area. However the overwhelming emphasis of what it says is towards opting for the "purity" of campaigns and against them being broad-based. An alternative approach would be to seek out the messages which can appeal to different segments of the population (who could be categorised in terms of their values) and to use this to build up a wide range of support for good campaigns. Common Cause concedes that trying to appeal to people on the basis of values we reject is problematic. Never mind, though: "sensitivity and creative thinking – particularly in our choices about when, where and how we engage with others – will help us surmount these barriers." (CCH, p.62). However we might not find that advice entirely reassuring.

A particularly significant example of what is at stake here is the discussion around the Stern Report, a review of the likely impacts of climate change which discussed them in economic terms, going beyond the pictures presented by natural science, and beyond the picture presented by science combined with ethics (e.g. appeals to intergenerational equity). This report made an enormous impact, even though much of it simply repeated what scientists had said a few years earlier. It reached an audience which had been unmoved by the science, and by science and ethics combined: it reached the money people, and it woke them up to the dangers of climate change in a way nothing else has. A success? Common Cause is not so happy about it, because of course it appealed to the wrong values (2010 pp. 49 - 53).

What does the popularity of Common Cause tell us?

A fourth area of difficulty for Common Cause is the rather simplistic "values categories" it uses, such as the "extrinsic"/"intrinsic" contrast. This important issue is discussed in other contributions to this pamphlet.

My concluding remarks now may not be of much interest to those who are unpersuaded of the case against the Common Cause approach. They will attribute its popularity simply to the fact that its analysis is right.

However if you believe the Common Cause approach to achieving change is wrong, or at least so incomplete and skewed in its analysis as to be seriously misleading, this raises an interesting question: why, despite its failings, has Common Cause proved popular on the Left, amongst NGOs, and amongst social movements? Why has it been supported by a range of different organisations? Why has it been the subject of seminars, training sessions, and secured a variety of messages of support?

It has a number of attractions. First, it is simple: bad things happen because society has the wrong values. Many people find simple answers very attractive. This also makes it possible to avoid entering into complex messy analyses of difficult things like global capitalism, neoliberalism, international finance, patterns of media ownership, and so on; or to engage with any of the political theory and historical debates about how social change happens.

Second, it is "nice". It avoids anyone having to raise issues about the distribution of power, and certainly avoids any attempt to capture or overthrow or even subtly infiltrate powerful social institutions. It is possible to assert good values but avoid anything which involves much conflict about the attempt to implement them.

This is of course entirely appropriate for some organisations, particularly those non-political charities which have no intention of challenging existing distributions of power or ideology. For them, "niceness" is enough, and any appearance of radicalism may just get in the way of what they are trying to do, and so the Common Cause analysis works for them. However the needs of such organisations are different from those of groups and movements which are looking for more significant and wide-ranging forms of social change.

Third, Common Cause is full of "get-out clauses" which help to create an "unfalsifiable" set of ideas. Whilst it concedes in theory that, for example "Values are simply another important element to consider" (CCH, p.61), in practice that is really the only element it considers, repeatedly emphasises, and builds its writings and other activities around. Much of the Common Cause literature is written in a way which assumes the caveats are in fact insignificant (for example, the 'Exercises' part of CCH, which is only about values, and the advice to charities given in 'Common Cause Communication', 2015). There is very little attempt to integrate analysis of values with analysis of other key factors, such as power, money, and ideology, in order to produce a more holistic understanding.

Fourth, it is "good". The Common Cause analysis puts its advocates "on the side of the angels". The values they hold are known to be good ones. Those of their opponents are bad ones. This takes away the need for forms of argumentation which

involve data or reasoning. Others are in the wrong simply because we don't like their values.

But much more than this is at stake. Common Cause represents the culmination, or at least the latest stage, of a process of deterioration in the way politics is analysed on the Left and left-of-centre. This is associated with, and to a large extent caused by, the decline of Marxism.

The major areas where there are deficiencies in the Common Cause approach – the areas of power, ideology, and alliances – were absolutely central to Marxist ways of analysing social change and political strategy. However Marxism had its own deficiencies too, and I don't seek to defend it. In order to underline that point, I will simply say that I believe that most of the Marxist tradition (despite interesting exceptions on each of these points) has had far too little understanding of divisions other than class, such as gender and ethnicity; was too simplistic and complacent about religion; underestimated the importance of ecological factors; gave insufficient attention to subjectivity and personal freedom; fell far too easily into dogmatism and therefore was unable to properly update itself; and had no serious theory of democracy, with a tendency to believe that all conflicts of opinion would ultimately be resolved into one big Hegelian unity.

However it also had important strengths, and as the influence of Marxism has declined, those strengths are now less available to campaigners for social change. These strengths included a willingness to analyse distributions and structures of power; consider the nature, importance, and sources of ideology; accept the need for alliances between different groupings with different motivations; try to understand the social implications of technological change; and see issues and policies against the background of how capitalism functions as a complex system.

If it is claimed that I am arguing against Common Cause in order to put a Marxist perspective in its place, it will be an obvious misrepresentation of my argument! Of course the ways in which the Marxist tradition did these things can be disputed, updated, improved on, or entirely got rid of. But then the task is to handle these issues more effectively, not to shy away from the hard questions they raise.

Post-Script: A Short Critique of Common Cause's 2016 report, 'Perceptions Matter'
By Sam Earle

In February 2016 Common Cause released a new report entitled "Perceptions Matter"[21], which seeks to identify people's perceptions of values, and why these perceptions are significant. In this short piece, I offer a three-pronged critique of the report, concluding that, unfortunately, I think the shortcomings represent "fatal blows" to its overall meaningfulness.

Among other things, the report asked 1000 people in the UK whether they value compassionate or selfish values most highly, which they think other people value most and which they think major UK institutions most encourage. It found that 74% of people value compassionate values most highly but that 77% believe that fellow UK citizens value selfish values more highly, and that institutions mostly encourage selfish values too. Reflecting on the findings, the report sets out to discover why people's perceptions are so inaccurate, and what can be done to remedy this. I challenge the methodological and logical premises of the report in the following ways:

1) Conceptual conflation

It seems that what the report is testing for are actually *beliefs*, not values. Surely values involve the alignment of belief and action – valuing is *active*, not passive. If I purport to value animals but routinely participate in their systematic abuse (from supporting horse racing or fox hunting to eating and wearing animal products), then, in any real sense, I cannot be said to value animals (except as instruments of my pleasure, in which case what I'm valuing is my pleasure, not the instrument). If I purport to value children's well-being, yet routinely subject them to harm (through exposure to inappropriate media, competitive environments, neglect, contributing to climate change, or buying products of child labour), I cannot be said to genuinely value their well-being. If I purport to be an environmentalist, yet continue to eat meat and fly regularly (two of the most damaging, yet easily avoided causes of environmental/climatic damage), I cannot really be said to value the environment.

Conversely, I can believe[22] that animals or children are valuable, but still behave in a way that *disvalues* them. I suggest that there are two main reasons for this: 1) that on the whole society does not have values (*qua* behaviour-guiding principles) but instead a variety of often contradictory mere norms[23], where one takes precedence over another depending on the social circumstance (e.g. norm 1: it's wrong to harm animals for pleasure, and norm 2: It's ok to harm animals for palate, sport or sartorial enjoyment); and 2) that in a liberal culture, expedience and gratification of the individual's preferences trump all other concerns – i.e. gratification of the self is the

overriding norm. It seems clear to me that most people routinely engage in these kinds of double standards – saying one thing, doing the opposite. And I have reached this conclusion through observing people's behaviour.

2) Methodological inconsistency

This brings us to a major methodological flaw in this study: in the first instance it asked people to report on their own beliefs, and in the next to report on other people's *behaviour* – because even though it inquired about (unknown) others' beliefs, the only way to infer the beliefs of others is through *observing their behaviour*. And thus it is not at all surprising to me that most people thought that other people favoured "selfish" values - because this *is* how people behave! And furthermore, this second seems far closer to measuring actual values – rather than purported beliefs. The report, however, has the effrontery to call this "inaccurate". I would suggest that these conceptual confusions undermine the aims of the report, which are premised on these dubious findings and lead to the "crucial question": "Why is it that such a large majority of people believe their fellow citizens hold selfish values to be more important, and compassionate values to be less important, than is actually the case?" (2016, p.1). The probable answer: they don't.

3) Central contradiction

The report suggests that the answer to this question is that people erroneously believe that social and cultural institutions – government, media, business, schools and universities – actively promote selfish values like concern for status, wealth and power. Wait a minute! Does Common Cause really mean to suggest that the most influential social institutions are somehow untouched by neo-liberalism? Or that neo-liberalism is no more than a conspiracy theory, a phantom villain spooking some citizens into questioning the genuinely benign and equitable intentions of the UK's institutions? It certainly seems that way, until we see that the suggested remedy for this malaise is in fact encouraging said institutions to promote policies (we've switched to values as actions again here) that are actually compassionate. Surely if the solution is actively embodying compassionate values, this suggests that until now this has not been the case. And if it is so that there is a dearth of compassionate values (and according to Crompton's 2010 report, this means there are selfish values at work instead), then surely all those "inaccurate" respondents who felt that institutions (and citizens) did not promote compassionate values were perhaps more accurate than they are given credit for. And even if there were a tacit third category of neutrality (rather than selfish or compassionate), there is still a contradiction at the heart of the report: the solution to embody compassionate values through policies and practices surely implies that perceptions are *accurately gauged through observing behaviours*, a notion that is contradicted by the earlier claim that people's beliefs about other people's values (behaviours) can be erroneous.

These three (by no means exhaustive) examples of the problems in the "Perceptions Matter" are, I believe, fatal: that is to say that they reveal contradictions in concepts and methodology that render the overall outcomes unintelligible or meaningless. This is not to say that we should give up on values, or that the cultivation of norms through perceptions does not carry significant social influence, but I firmly believe that progressive organisations, activists and thinkers need to work together to produce thoroughly considered and robust foundations for values research and activism.

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Endnotes

[1] See http://www.cultdyn.co.uk/valuesmodes.html

[2] It is intriguing and ironic that I am able to make this criticism of Common Cause, for the *opposite* criticism is made by Rose: that *too much* in the way of leadership is offered by the Common Cause approach, which therefore is allegedly restricted in its appeal to 'pioneers' (See http://www.campaignstrategy.org/articles/time_for_strategy.pdf.) Rose suggests here that Crompton errs in seeking to leave behind marketing altogether in the name of values-based-leadership. But, from the point of view of someone involved in radical electoral politics, this is wrong: It is *necessary* for politicians to show leadership, especially when trying to change the paradigm, as Greens typically do. The grave danger of Common Cause is that its use of Schwartz discourages people from trying to show leadership, when that leadership requires *achieving* things, being in the public spotlight, etc. (I return to this point, below, including in n.3 & n.4).
The leadership essential in Green electoral politics is a different *kind* of leadership to the 'purist' values-leadership, so pure that (self-defeatingly) it eschews *success*, that once dominated in the Green Party, and that risks dominating the reception of Common Cause.

[3] http://www.campaignstrategy.org/articles/usingvaluemodes.pdf . There has been much (often bad-tempered) argument between the Dade-Rose approach and the Crompton approach. My sympathies are in the end more with the latter than the former. However, I don't think that the Cromptonian Common Cause approach does itself any favours by claiming that it can be proven through 'psychological science' that it is valid and that the Dade-Rose Values Modes approach is not (cf. http://valuesandframes.org/value-modes-and-common-cause-response-to-rose/). For I think that the dispute is in significant part a matter of what is politically and philosophically possible – and we do not know and *cannot* (in advance of history) know the answer to that question. Moreover, I think that the Rose vs. Crompton antagonism can be to some extent overcome. I think that common cause can and should be found among reframing-minded environmentalists. Cromptonians need to *live up to* the name 'Common Cause'; they need to be *congruent* with their 'brand'; they are not doing so if they spend a lot of time negatively criticising the Dade-Rose approach, rather than looking for common ground. Finding this common ground will require some give and take on both sides (which hasn't been hugely in evidence yet!). It will require some instantiation of values/practices of altruism, good listening etc. within the dispute itself. It will require both sides acknowledging first the simple point that the Rose approach is likely to be more short-term effective, the Crompton approach more likely to be long-term effective. And it will require looking at cases to see whether there are (as I suspect there are) grounds for a 'horses-for-courses' approach.

[4] Thus in practice there may be a grave danger in the Common Cause approach of delegitimising leadership (which is sometimes assumed to be tied *inevitably* to egoistic attitudes), thus ensuring that we never actually WIN. (This can risk fatally undermining the viability/appeal of a Common Cause approach to those active in electoral politics.)

[5] Thus: the Schwartzian circumplex risks one's approach being too ***conservative***.
The irony here then is, once more, that, far from being too radical, as Dade-Rose take the Crompton approach of providing 'signposts' to be (cf.
www.assets.wwf.org.uk/downloads/weathercocks_report2.pdf), the latter risks still being too conservative. Supplying insufficient leadership, remaining in hock to existing values modes, and to the 'wisdom' of focus groups, which merely telescope existing common sense, rather than offering a path to a new common-sense. The way out of this is for the Common Cause approach to make plain that '*the circumplex' is not immutable.* That, indeed, *we should work together* to try to make it less true, *to try to change its shape.* This requires giving up the alleged permanent foundation in scientific psychology for the validity of Common Cause.

[6] For detailed argumentation toward this conclusion, see my books *There is no such thing as a social science* (co-authored with Phil Hutchinson and Wes Sharock) and *Wittgenstein among the sciences*. See also http://blog.talkingphilosophy.com/?p=6884 (and http://storify.com/NeuroWhoa/psychology-as-science).

[7] This and the following paragraphs are strongly influenced by correspondence with Tom Crompton, whose help I want to stress here.

[8] Those societies – a tiny minority of the societies that have existed in all of human existence -- helpfully called 'WEIRD' by Jared Diamond: Western, Educated, Industrial, Rich, Democratic (sic.):

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/books/non_fictionreviews/9756597/The-World-Until-Yesterday-by-Jared-Diamond-review.html

[9] Once more: Focus groups will interpret things according to today's common sense – they need tell us nothing about how that common sense is shaped and changed.

[10] I draw here directly on the research that in recent years I have been publishing jointly with Nassim Taleb (see e.g. http://www.fooledbyrandomness.com/pp2.pdf). It was Taleb who first pointed out to me the hazard implicit in the 'Nudge' approach - that the elite may choose to impose recklessness onto the populace at large, through default options and benign (sic.) paternalism.

[11] And it may be that the concept of sustainability itself will fall by the wayside, in the process: so I have argued, in
http://www.greenhousethinktank.org/files/greenhouse/home/post_growth_commonsense_inside.pdf

[12] See my
http://www.greenhousethinktank.org/files/greenhouse/home/post_growth_commonsense_inside.pdf ,
from the "A note on methodology" section of which parts of the present piece are excerpted and updated.

[13] The ideology needed for our time is, I would claim, a radically-conservative and seriously-egalitarian ecologism: see myhttp://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/archives/34514. But I do not rely on this claim, here.

[14] Though it might. A new democratic revolution. (See e.g. David Graeber's recent work.)

[15] One can get a sense of what such conceptual rupture means most profoundly perhaps from the work of Thomas Kuhn – see my book KUHN (Oxford: Polity, 2002; co-authored with Wes Sharrock).

[16] Thanks to various people, including Sam Earle (especially), Victor Anderson, Tom Crompton, Pat Dade and Ed Gillespie, for help with this material (some of which is reworked from my previously Green House report on 'Post-growth common sense'). Earle's thinking has been vital to the way in which my thinking in this area has recently been recast. However, I'm much less worried than Earle is by 'autonomy', and thus am less critical of Common Cause. Indeed, my central concern about both Crompton and Dobson is in one respect almost opposite to Earle's. Like Gillespie, I think that there is an important respect in which 'Common Cause' and 'Sustainability Citizenship' should be *less* worried about being 'paternalistic' than they in fact are.

[17] E.g. 2000. For a host of information and resources of SDT see http://selfdeterminationtheory.org

[18] See Read's piece in this report for a convincing argument for the crucial role of leadership and power in achieving socially and ecologically progressive goals.

[19] Crompton's latest report "Perceptions Matter" (2016), also seems to be premised on conflated conceptions of values and beliefs. (See the addendum at the end of the present piece for a short critique of this new work.)

[20] The "Perceptions Matter "(2016) report involves a vast study, but despite the complexity of the data set, there are several methodological flaws and contradictions, which fatally undermine the study (see addendum).

[21] Common Cause Foundation (2016) Perceptions Matter: The Common Cause UK Values Survey, London: Common Cause Foundation.

[22] We might argue, however, about whether beliefs can be false or erroneous or not.

[23] See Earle (2016) in this report for elucidation of this idea.